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Article 6

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS

DEBORAH L. RHODE*
Teaching professional responsibility poses special challenges; so too, does
writing about it. I have generally avoided the topic out of concern that advice
might seem presumptuous or platitudinous, and that too much candor about
prior follies might depress or discourage new entrants to the field. I can still
recall a teaching workshop on legal ethics at which I and other battle-hardened
veterans amused our audience with disasters we had aided and abetted. At one
end of the spectrum were the death marches through moral philosophy—the
functional equivalent of Cliffs Notes on Kant. At the other end were bar
preparation courses for the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam—legal
ethics without the ethics. And in the middle were many valiant attempts to
present real moral dilemmas and regulatory issues that bumped up against
student resistance or constraints of classroom size and format. The impression
created was that, like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, all professional
responsibility courses could be unhappy in their own way.
Such confessions may have been good for the soul and may have saved
some members of the audience from replicating our own sins of omission and
commission. But the net effect may also have been unduly dispiriting. The
challenges of teaching professional responsibility are significant, but so too are
the rewards. The questions at issue truly matter for the lives our students will
live, the profession they will constitute, and the public they will serve. So
helping each other teach this course well also matters. We have an opportunity
to influence the ethical compass of those who will shape our legal,
commercial, and policy settings. We owe it to them, to ourselves, and to the
broader community to share and reassess our educational strategies. In that
spirit, let me offer a few comments based both on my reading of the literature
and on a quarter century’s experience teaching with varied formats in schools
with somewhat different cultures.

* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director, Center on Ethics, Stanford University.
B.A., J.D. Yale University. The comments of Stephen Gillers and Bruce Green are gratefully
acknowledged.
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I. OBJECTIVES
My goals for the course are ambitious, but not atypical. The first is to
build understanding of the legal standards and regulatory processes governing
lawyers’ conduct.1 A related objective is to help students recognize and
analyze ethical issues in light of those standards and broader moral
frameworks.2 Future practitioners need to know where the lines are before
they are in a position to cross one. But they also need to consider where the
lines should be, and how they will address issues on which the profession’s
rules are ambiguous or leave ample room for discretion. Building students’
capacity for reflective judgment should be a central objective of any course on
professional responsibility.3 Although no classroom setting can fully simulate
the pressures of practice, students can be urged to consider recurrent ethical
dilemmas against a realistic social backdrop in which peer pressures, client
loyalties, financial considerations, and moral convictions may tug in different
directions. There is something to be said for having future practitioners
confront such questions before they have a vested interest in coming out one
way rather than another.
To promote informed analysis, some introduction of interdisciplinary
perspectives can be useful. An understanding of the logic and limitations of
professional regulatory structures requires a corresponding understanding of
market failures, bar politics, and the difficulties of collective action.4 An
evaluation of standards governing confidentiality, client loyalty, and related
issues can proceed at a more sophisticated level if students have some

1. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992); Bruce
A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 362–
65 (1998) [hereinafter Green, Less is More]; Bruce A. Green, Teaching Lawyers Ethics, 51 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1091 (2007).
2. Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A Proposal for a
Deliberative Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256, 1339–41 (1992); Douglas N. Frenkel,
On Trying to Teach Judgment, 12 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19, 31 (2001); Thomas D. Morgan, Use of
the Problem Method for Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 409, 409 (1998).
3. Croft, supra note 2, at 1341; Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to be a
Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in
Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 520 (2003); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 39 (1995).
4. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 728–29, 777 (4th ed. 2004);
David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to Regulate the Very
Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 206 (2004);
Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 433 (2001); Roger C.
Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 160–61 (1997).
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familiarity with the central traditions of moral reasoning.5 The challenges of
ethical decision-making become clearer if students have some exposure to
cognitive bias, organizational culture, situational influence, and additional
emotional and psychological factors that can impair judgment.6 Although no
single course can do justice to all of this material, some basic insights on
selected issues can enrich coverage.
For example, recent financial scandals can be the occasion for exploring
both the psychological predispositions and organizational pathologies that
contribute to fraud. These include both lawyers’ and clients’ tendencies
toward overconfidence and the suppression of dissonant information.7 An
escalation of commitment to choices that turn out to be wrong, either factually
or morally, can lead to ever more dubious conduct.8 In organizational contexts
where responsibility for a final decision is diffused, and financial and peer
pressure work against questioning client choices, the result may be the moral
meltdowns recently on display in Enron et al.9 Enabling students to recognize
the cognitive and structural forces that compromise moral judgment may
inform their individual decision-making. It may also assist them as advisors,
regulators, and policy makers in designing institutional checks and balances
that will address those compromising influences.
5. See, for example, the overview of utilitarian, deontological, and virtue-based theories
and their application to legal ethics issues in RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 4, at 8–12, 389–403.
6. For an overview of the literature on cognitive bias, see Michael B. Metzger, Bridging the
Gaps: Cognitive Constraints on Corporate Control & Ethics Education, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 435 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317 (2006).
For organizational culture, see generally the sources cited in ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES:
THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988); RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 4, at 429–57;
John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13, 17 (David M. Messick & Ann E.
Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); Rhode, supra. For situational influences, see LEE ROSS & RICHARD E.
NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 42–49
(1991). For the role of emotions in moral behavior, see Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and
Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814,
817–18 (2001); Alan M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social
Psychology Teach Us About Teaching Law Students to Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible,
Choices, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 643, 671–74 (2004).
7. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition:
Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 971 (2002);
David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision
Making, 37 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 9, 19 (1996); Metzger, supra note 6, at 478–79, 493.
8. See Darley, supra note 6, at 21.
9. John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1186–87 (2005); David Luban, Making Sense of Moral
Meltdowns, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND
POLICY 57, 69–73 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Where Is the Leadership in
Moral Leadership, in MORAL LEADERSHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT,
AND POLICY 1, 27–30 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006).
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A final objective of many professional responsibility courses, my own
included, is to encourage future lawyers to think more deeply about the kind of
life they want to lead, the profession they want to serve, and how both can
contribute to their vision of a just society.10 For some students, this will be
their only classroom opportunity to consider how future choices about jobs,
clients, public service, and social responsibility will match the values that sent
them to law school in the first instance.11 A wide range of materials can assist
that reflective process, such as descriptions of the conditions of practice, the
urgency of problems related to access to justice, the rewards of pro bono work,
and the career paths of exemplary lawyers. Surveys of young attorneys
consistently find that their greatest dissatisfaction with their professional work
is its lack of connection to the social good.12 Getting new entrants to the bar to
think systematically about how to mesh their principles with their practice is
one step toward addressing that frustration.
Considerable evidence also indicates that a growing number of
professionals would like a better work/life balance and would be happier with
a different trade-off between income and hours than that now prevailing in
many practice settings.13 Excessive work demands are a major cause of
physical and mental health difficulties and related performance problems, as
well as inadequate time for pro bono work.14 An informed discussion of these
issues may encourage students not to settle, at least not in the long run, for a

10. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 159–60; Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Law School as
a Culture of Conversation: Re-imagining Legal Education as a Process of Conversion to the
Demands of Authentic Conversation, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 333, 363–64 (1997); Howard Lesnick,
Being a Teacher, of Lawyers: Discerning the Theory of My Practice, 43 Hastings L.J. 1095, 1101
(1992); Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Enough?, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 583, 591–92 (1998).
11. See Granfield & Koenig, supra note 3, at 498.
12. See AM. BAR ASS’N YOUNG LAW. DIV., CAREER SATISFACTION 21, available at
http://www.abanet.org/yld/satisfaction_800.doc (last visited May 20, 2007).
13. A variety of authors have noted the evidence provided by surveys. See SUSAN SAAB
FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF ATTORNEY WORK-LIFE BALANCE: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT
17 (2005) (noting that over seventy percent of supervised attorney respondents reported moderate
to major problems in finding time for family needs and other non-work activities); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 26 (2000)
[hereinafter RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE]; Jonathan Clements, Money and Happiness:
Here’s Why You Won’t Laugh All the Way to the Bank, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2006, at D1;
Stephanie Francis Ward, the Ultimate Time-Money Trade-Off, ABA J., Feb. 2007, at 24; Daniel
Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier if You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion, 312 SCIENCE
1908, 1910 (2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives for Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2207,
2208, 2212 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode, Balanced Lives].
14. For health difficulties, see FORTNEY, supra note 13, at 25–27; Rhode, Balanced Lives,
supra note 13, at 2208–09. For the impact of billable hour quotas on pro bono work, see
DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE
PROFESSIONS 132–35 (2004).
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practice setting that leaves too little time for family, friends, and causes to
which they are committed. Making future practitioners more aware of how
different legal employers accommodate family and pro bono commitments and
how those accommodations affect lawyers’ satisfaction may help build support
for workplace reform.
Not all of these objectives can be fully realized in any single course.
Professors will make different choices about where to concentrate attention
and what trade-offs to make between depth and breadth. But this agenda
identifies the range of issues that schools should aim to address somewhere in
their professional responsibility curricula.
II. CHALLENGES
How often legal ethics courses succeed with an ambitious agenda is
anyone’s guess, but a safe answer is probably much less often than their
professors would like. The consensus among experts in professional
responsibility is that courses in the subject are among the most difficult to
teach.15 There are a number of reasons why, and the problems are not all
readily surmounted.
The first involves a mismatch between institutional resources, student
expectations, and faculty aspirations.16 A threshold difficulty is that most
schools meet accreditation standards requiring instruction in professional
responsibility through a single upper-level mandatory course.17 Some schools
provide insufficient units, curricular choices, or manageable class sizes to
minimize student resistance and reinforce the importance of the topic. After
the first year, students expect electives, and a required class in a subject they
may not want with a professor they would not choose is bound to evoke some
backlash.18 As Stephen Gillers notes, those with little experience in the legal
world they are about to inhabit may fail to see the personal relevance or market
value of professional responsibility courses.19 The problem is compounded by
the skepticism that many students bring to discussions about ethics in general

15. Stephen Gillers, “Eat Your Spinach?”, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1215, 1219 (2007); Frenkel,
supra note 2, at 22; Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 38; Green, Less is More, supra note 1,
at 358; Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal Ethics
Courses: A Dialogue About Goals, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 457, 457, 459–60 (1998); Cramton
& Koniak, supra note 4, at 146–47; William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65 (1991).
16. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 147–48; Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 38–
39.
17. The ABA’s accreditation standard requires instruction in “the history, goals, structure,
values, rules, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.” ABA STANDARDS
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 302(a)(5) (2006).
18. See Gillers, supra note 15, at 1219.
19. Id.; see Frenkel, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing student resistance generally).
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and legal ethics in particular. As educators have long noted, law schools’
reliance on quasi-Socratic teaching tends to foster a cynical or relativist
response to moral issues.20 The strong message is that “there is always an
argument the other way, and the Devil usually has a very good case.”21 This
stance makes some students especially skeptical about the value of classroom
discussion of values. If everyone’s position has a plausible counter position,
what is the point of debate? To the most cynical observers, the bar’s
requirements of ethics instruction and a muliti-state ethics exam seem designed
mainly to shore up the profession’s public image and should be satisfied with
the least effort possible.22
These students are predisposed to view any classroom agenda, beyond
preparation for the bar exam, as a waste of time. They start the course
interested only in the law of lawyering that examiners test.23 At least initially,
they resist attempts to raise issues of personal values and professional identity.
They do not want to hear their classmates mouthing off about “mushy pap.”24
Nor are all students interested in a candid discussion of moral ambiguity or the
dark side of practice. Ethical uncertainty is an uncomfortable state.25 And
those who have already committed to a particular practice setting may not
welcome rain on their parade.26 Their response to the introduction of
disquieting messages may be to shoot the messenger. Even those students who
are less resistant to the subject matter may lack sufficient experience with legal
practice to engage in the contextual analysis necessary for informed ethical
decision-making.
So too, some professional responsibility teachers may be uncomfortable
initiating value-laden discussions in which they have no special legal expertise.
Many faculty are understandably wary of appearing to pontificate from the
podium or to denigrate a practice structure that their students are at pains to
enter. As William Simon notes, “Ethics teachers in professional schools worry
about their credibility with students. Their students aspire to be practitioners.
The teachers do not . . . [and] their knowledge of the circumstances of practice
20. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247, 262 (1978); Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875,
878–79 (1985); Alan Hirsch, The Moral Failure of Law Schools, WASH. L. & POL., June 1998, at
29; Stewart Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II: Some Notes on Two
Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 523–25 (1982).
21. Macaulay, supra note 20, at 524.
22. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 151–53.
23. Id. at 153–54.
24. Id. at 145; see also Frenkel, supra note 2, at 23–24.
25. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
63, 73–83 (1980); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1 (1976) (providing some of the classic accounts of lawyers’ discomfort with an unsettled
moral universe).
26. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 203.
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is limited . . . .27 Other professors are skeptical about the ability of any single
course to affect values that may already be well developed by the time
individuals reach law school. Even faculty who would like to engage deeper
moral questions may find themselves with a class too large to encourage
candid dialogue on these issues.
Yet professors who avoid these problems by teaching to the bar exam often
end up disappointing themselves and the great majority of their students. The
reasons are rooted in the design of the exam and emerged clearly in a panel
discussion I once had with one of its architects. In response to concerns that
the test’s multiple choice format trivialized ethical issues, he explained that the
only affordable alternative was worse.28 The essay questions that preceded the
multi-state format and focused on important questions failed to yield a curve.
Virtually all bar applicants took the moral high road.29 By contrast, a multiple
choice exam could test knowledge of more obscure rules and frame possible
answers in ambiguous or counter-intuitive ways, so that a critical mass of
poorly prepared candidates would fail.30
To allow bar exams to dictate the agenda of professional responsibility
courses would exclude much that is important in the field. On many key
issues, bar ethical rules are silent, ambiguous, or permissive.31 For example,
under the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers have
discretion whether to disclose confidential information to prevent criminal or
fraudulent acts, whether to withdraw from representation that has become
repugnant, and whether to raise moral, political, or social concerns when
counseling clients.32 Knowledge of what the rules say can only begin, not end,
analysis of how discretion should be exercised. Nor do the rules give adequate
guidance on what constitutes “competent” representation or “reasonable” fees;
much depends on context, and requires a far more nuanced analysis than is
necessary or even helpful for passing the bar exam.33 So too, a large part of
the law of lawyering is determined not by bar ethical standards, but by criminal
and civil statutes, malpractice doctrine, judicial sanctions, and agency

27. William H. Simon, The Ethics Teacher’s Bittersweet Revenge: Virtue and Risk
Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2006).
28. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 41 (1992).
29. Id.
30. Of course, whether such a screening strategy excludes applicants who are most likely to
cause ethical problems is another matter. Few bar disciplinary actions or justifiable client
complaints stem from ignorance of relevant rules; most involve felonies, misappropriation of
funds, and egregious performance issues that are rooted more in behavioral and office
management problems than lack of knowledge of bar ethical standards. RHODE & LUBAN, supra
note 4, at 825–27, 836.
31. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 201.
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.16, 2.1 (2007).
33. See id. at R. 1.1, 1.5.
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regulations that are beyond the scope of the exam.34 Also excluded by that test
are an entire range of critical policy questions, such as how to improve
professional regulatory structures, increase access to justice, and encourage pro
bono service.
The evolution of the bar’s code of conduct over the last century toward a
more legalistic formulation also has made it less useful in socializing new
entrants to the highest standards of professionalism. Unlike its predecessors,
the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct include little by way of
ethical aspirations.35 Limiting a course in professional responsibility to
statutory analysis of the Model Rules is bound to be dispiriting, particularly in
contexts where the Rules are more responsive to professional than public
interests.36 As David Luban and Michael Millemann put it, if a teacher “tries
to draw her [standards] of professionalism from a de-moralized code, she is
almost certain to become demoralized.”37 The same is obviously true for
students.38
Related challenges come from colleagues, who often view the field as an
intellectual backwater, which traps participants in a misconceived mission.
Judge Richard Posner puts a common assumption with uncommon candor: “As
for the task of instilling ethics in law students at . . . law schools, I can think of
few things more futile than attempting to teach people to be good.”39 Yet this
characterization both overstates the objectives of professional responsibility
courses and understates their influence. I have never encountered anyone in

34. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 174; Joan L. O’Sullivan et al., Ethical
Decisionmaking and Ethics Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 110
n.5 (1996).
35. The ABA’s 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility included Ethical Considerations
along with Disciplinary Rules. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 44. The ABA’s Canons
of Ethics were entirely aspirational. Id. They functioned as guidance to judicial and disciplinary
bodies but had no legally binding force; unlike their successors, they were never promulgated as
court rules by state supreme courts. Id. For a defense of this evolution, see Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L. J. 1239, 1258 (1991); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules
of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 77, 84–85 (1981).
36. See generally RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, (discussing these
contexts).
37. Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 58.
38. As Cramton and Koniak note, exposing students to “pedestrian and unchallenging
instruction,” like that of bar preparation courses, may induce the kind of moral indifference that
the legal ethics requirement is designed to counteract. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 154;
see also Frenkel, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that focus only on codes “tends to produce a
stultifying classroom.”).
39. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1924 (1993). For similar views, see Gillers, supra note 15; Peter Steinfels,
The University’s Role in Instilling a Moral Code Among Students? None Whatever, Some Argue,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004, at A13 (quoting Stanley Fish’s comment to his university colleagues
that “You can’t make . . . [students] into good people and you shouldn’t try”).
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the field of professional ethics who describes the goal of his or her course as
“teaching people to be good.” Nor does the evidence available suggest that the
less grandiose objectives noted earlier, of making students more informed and
reflective about professional responsibilities, are beyond the capacities of law
school curricula. Research on ethics education finds that individuals’ moral
views and strategies change significantly during early adulthood and that welldesigned courses can improve capacities for moral reasoning.40 Many crucial
professional responsibility issues involve tradeoffs among competing values in
contexts that students will not have considered prior to law school. And many
important bar regulatory issues call on conventional techniques of policy
analysis that are not distinctive to courses on ethics.
Can students be convinced? In my experience, most of them most of the
time, with the help of strategies such as those outlined below. Many graduates
also wish their law school classes had given them more help in resolving the
difficult ethical issues that confront them in practice.41 There is, moreover,
something to be said for giving students what they will need as lawyers,
whether or not it is what they want in law school. But teachers of professional
responsibility also need approaches that will reduce resistance. The success of
their courses will depend on how they are taught, what choices are available to
students, and how the subject is viewed in the academic culture. Let me close
with some concrete strategies for meeting the challenges that teaching
professional responsibility presents.
III. STRATEGIES
Effective education in professional responsibility requires attention not
only to courses specializing in that subject, but also to their institutional
context. In an ideal world, the topic would be integrated throughout the core
curriculum and given focused attention in a range of upper-level courses,
particularly clinics. Students are much more likely to take the subject seriously
if other professors do so as well and discuss ethical issues in the context of
their own fields of expertise.42 Students pick up messages from what is

40. See sources cited in RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 4, at 996–1005; Steven Hartwell,
Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995);
Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law
School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 734 (1998).
41. Granfield & Koenig, supra note 3, at 519–20.
42. For the argument for curricular integration, see RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE,
supra note 13, at 203; Rhode, supra note 28, at 50–53. How often this occurs is open to question.
For a discussion of faculty resistance, see Gillers, supra note 15, at 1216–17; Marjorie L. Girth,
Facing Ethical Issues with Law Students in an Adversary Context, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 593,
597 (2005). For a discussion of law schools’ failure to give ethical issues the importance it
deserves, see Cramton & Koniak, supra note 4, at 146–48, 155–59; Pearce, supra note 40, at 720.
By contrast, about “three-fourths (76%) of students indicated their school emphasized to a
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missing or marginal in the core curriculum. Professional responsibility courses
are less likely to be regarded as a diversion from what is really important if the
subject is treated with respect by the faculty as a whole.
It is equally important to give students some choice in satisfying the
professional responsibility requirement.
Resistance to an upper-level
mandatory course is less likely if various options are available, including
courses that situate ethics in particular substantive areas, such as tax, business,
family, criminal, poverty, or public interest practice.43 These courses can add
depth and relevance for students who have identified the field where they are
likely to specialize.
One especially effective approach is to link professional responsibility with
clinical courses or externships. The best way to improve ethical judgment is
generally through engagement with real problems, involving real clients. As
Luban and Millemann note, moral decision-making involves more than
knowledge of relevant rules and principles; it also demands a capacity to
understand how those rules apply and which principles are most important in
concrete settings.44 Clinics and externships can provide the kind of
experiential knowledge and guided reflection that are conducive to adult
learning, particularly on ethical issues.45 When cases involve clients from
disadvantaged backgrounds, students can gain cross-cultural competence and
direct understanding of how the law functions or fails to function for the havenots.46 Such exposure brings home the urgent need for pro bono service and
greater access to justice in a way that abstract discussion cannot. Although
clinics and externships necessarily address ethical issues that arise in
placements, not all clinical teachers or practice supervisors have the time,
substantial degree the ethical practice of the law.” LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT
ENGAGEMENT, LSSSE 2004 OVERVIEW 4 (2004), available at http://lssse.iub.edu/pdf/
lssse_2004_overview.pdf.
43. For a discussion of various ways that legal ethics has been incorporated into the law
school curriculum, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE
PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998); Girth, supra note 42, at 596–97.
44. Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 39.
45. Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and Morality”, 4 CLINICAL L.
REV. 1, 23–25 (1998); Hartwell, supra note 40, at 522–28 (1995); James E. Moliterno, Legal
Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
71, 81 (1997) [hereinafter Moliterno, Legal Education]. For a discussion of the value of clinics in
teaching legal ethics, see, for example, Robert P. Burns, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law
Practice, 75 NEB. L. REV. 684, 692–96 (1996); Peter A. Joy, The Law School Clinic as a Model
Ethical Law Office, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 35 (2004); Lerner, supra note 6, at 694–95;
O’Sullivan et al., supra note 34; Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 (1996). For a discussion of the linkage to externships see Lerman,
supra note 15, at 485; Moliterno, Legal Education, supra, at 107–17; James E. Moliterno,
Practice Setting as an Organizing Theme for a Law and Ethics of Lawyering Curriculum, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 402–03 (1998).
46. See Jane Harris Aiken, supra note 45, at 24–27.
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interest, and expertise to provide comprehensive coverage. Linking a
professional responsibility course to a clinic, or building in additional units to
focus on core topics, may be necessary to ensure systematic treatment
regardless of what happens to surface in a given semester.
Of course, not all law schools will have sufficient faculty resources to
provide most professional responsibility instruction through clinical
opportunities or specialized “ethics and . . .” courses. When most students will
satisfy their requirement in a professional responsibility survey course, it is
helpful if they have some choice among instructors and format. It is also
desirable to avoid large classes. Candid discussion on personal, value-laden
issues becomes increasingly difficult once enrollment gets over a certain size.
But whatever the size, student engagement is likely to be greater if the course
includes exercises involving hypothetical problems, role simulations, and
breakouts into small groups.47 Although these exercises lack the immediacy
provided in clinics or externships, they permit more systematic, sequential
coverage of a wider range of issues for larger numbers of students.48 As
experts have long recognized, such interactive approaches are more effective
than pure lectures in promoting sustained learning.49
Other materials are also helpful in supplementing a basic textbook. Clips
from movies, television, and filmed vignettes can be effective in providing
context and catalysts for class discussion, and their vividness is likely to
enhance attention as well as retention.50 Literary portraits can also push
conversations to a deeper level and invite students to bring non-legal
perspectives to issues that have relevance for legal practitioners.51 For
47. Lerner, supra note 6, at 695–96.
48. See Girth, supra note 42, at 604; see also Moliterno, Legal Education, supra note 45, at
107–17 (discussing the use of simulations); Morgan, supra note 2, 413–19 (1998) (discussing the
value of problems).
49. See the literature summarized in DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE:
SCHOLARS, STATUS AND ACADEMIC CULTURE (forthcoming 2007); Hartwell, supra note 40. For
one of the early, classic accounts, see Carl R. Rogers, Toward a Theory of Creativity, 11 ETC: A
REV. OF GEN. SEMANTICS 249, 256 (1954) (noting that the only learning that really sticks is that
which is self- discovered).
50. John Batt, Law, Science and Narrative: Reflections on Brain Science, Electronic Media,
Story, and Law Learning, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19 (1990); Frenkel, supra note 2, at 36; Videotape:
Stephen Gillers Adventures in Legal Ethics (N.Y.U School of Law 1994) (on file with the Saint
Louis University Omer Poos Law Library) (including a wide range of well-done scenarios); see
also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers: Lawyering in Literature,
Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career and Craft, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2000) (pointing to television, film, and literature as sources of discussion
topics).
51. For a discussion of the value of narrative in legal ethics education and a wide range of
examples, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories
to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2001). For a discussion of the value of
literature as an educational strategy more generally, see ROBERT COLES, THE CALL OF STORIES:
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example, Leo Tolstoy’s Death of Ivan Ilych and Margaret Edson’s Pulitizer
Prize winning play, W;t, offer portraits of dying professionals—a lawyer and
an academic—who look back on their lives and are not happy with the
conventional ambitions that they have pursued.52 Though both works can
make for painful reading, they bring home in powerful ways the importance of
thinking, at the beginning of a career, what would seem valuable at the end. A
similar message comes through from Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the
Day, a moving account of a butler’s professional role and moral compromise,
which has generated a rich secondary legal literature.53 A more uplifting
narrative is Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons. It offers a heroic profile of
Sir Thomas More, a lawyer willing to die for his principles, surrounded by
others prepared to trade their integrity for personal advance.54 Excerpts from
films of these works can supplement or substitute for readings.
Case histories and biographies can similarly supply the kind of thick
description that enriches understanding of professional roles. Legal Ethics
Stories offers rich narratives on a range of well-known cases.55 Celebrated
securities scandals including National Securities Marketing and Enron have
generated novels, documentaries, and accompanying teaching materials that
vividly demonstrate the cognitive biases and organizational pathologies noted
earlier.56 By contrast, profiles of professional courage by American lawyers,
TEACHING AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION (1989); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990); JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS
OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS (1994); James Boyd
White, Teaching Law and Literature, 27 MOSAIC 1 (1994). For a collection of short stories that
are relevant to legal ethics, see LAWRENCE J. FOX, LEGAL TENDER: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO
HANDLING PROFESSIONAL DILEMMAS (1995). For a symposium on stories relevant to legal
ethics, see Symposium, Case Studies in Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2001).
52. LEO TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH (Ann Pasternak Slater trans., Random
House, Inc. 2003) (1886); MARGARET EDSON, W;T (1999).
53. KAZUO ISHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989); see Rob Atkinson, How the
Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of The Remains of the Day, 105 YALE
L.J. 177 (1995) (discussing The Remains of the Day); David Luban, Steven’s Professionalism and
Ours, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 297 (1996) (same); W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers:
The Remains of Amoral Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 161 (1996) (same).
54. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962). For a description of how to present
character-related lessons from literary portraits such as A Man for All Seasons, see JOSEPH L.
BADARACCO, JR., QUESTIONS OF CHARACTER: ILLUMINATING THE HEART OF LEADERSHIP
THROUGH LITERATURE 142–59 (2006).
55. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS STORIES (2006).
56. For a discussion of the National Student Marketing scandal, see ARTHUR R. G.
SOLMSSEN, THE COMFORT LETTER (1975), which was discussed in Richard W. Painter,
Irrationality and Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur Solmssen’s The Comfort Letter, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1113–21 (2001). For a discussion of the Enron scandal, see ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds.,
2004); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
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such as John Adams, Charles Houston, Abraham Lincoln, and Thurgood
Marshall, can provide positive models of moral decision-making, and in forms
more nuanced and memorable than conventional analytic approaches.57
Similar payoffs may come from integration of interdisciplinary and
practitioner perspectives. Materials and experts from business, medical,
journalistic, or engineering ethics give students a window into their own
profession and frequently serve to jog otherwise unchallenged assumptions on
issues like confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and third-party responsibilities.
Courses that combine students and faculty from different disciplines offer
particularly valuable settings to explore cross-cutting ethical concerns and
prepare participants for an increasingly multidisciplinary legal landscape.58
Visitors from practice can also be excellent if they are candid and selfreflective and if they prepare something beyond war stories. Involving them as
participants rather than lecturers can minimize the risks of turning the course
into Anecdote 101.59
Strategies for encouraging adequate class preparation are also important.
Unlike other more technical subject matter, which cannot be understood unless
students have done the reading, ethical issues are relatively accessible. This
has the obvious advantage of permitting broad class participation, but the
equally obvious disadvantage of reducing students’ incentives to prepare. The
problem is compounded if professors compensate by summarizing the assigned
materials. A more effective option can be to require short weekly reflection
papers in lieu of an exam. If the class is a manageable size, professors can
comment on these papers on a regular basis. Alternatively, students can form
teams and comment on each others’ papers. At the end of the semester, the

57. For a discussion of Thurgood Marshall, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
219–24 (Vintage Books 2004) (1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 (1994). For a discussion of
Charles Houston, see Genna Rae McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston: Social Engineer for Civil
Rights, in BLACK LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 221–39 (John Hope Franklin &
August Meier eds., 1982). For other examples, including discussions of Hamilton and Lincoln,
see Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 35, at 1243–45. For a discussion of the
courage of southern judges in implementing civil rights decisions, see JACK BASS, UNLIKELY
HEROES (1981). For a discussion of the value of modeling virtue through example, see
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981).
58. For examples of such approaches, see Erin A. Egan, Kayhan Parsi & Cynthia Ramirez,
Comparing Ethics Education in Medicine and Law: Combining the Best of Both Worlds, 13
ANNALS HEALTH L. 303, 316 (2004); Girth, supra note 42, at 612–14; David B. Wilkins,
Redefining the “Professional” in Professional Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching
Professionalism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (1995).
59. For a description of a systematic effort to involve the organized bar, see Lois R. Lupica,
Professional Responsibility Redesigned: Sparking a Dialogue Between Students and the Bar, 29
J. LEGAL PROF. 71 (2005).
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professor can then read each student’s file or a selected sample of the papers.
Needless to say, that is a time-consuming process and will not work if the class
is too large. But the advantage is that it produces a better quality of discussion
throughout the semester and rewards the students who take the material
seriously.
Finally, we could do more to assess the effectiveness of our teaching
strategies. Course evaluations at the end of the semester give relatively little
information about how well we are preparing graduates for the issues they will
confront in practice. Law schools have done far too little to address the large
knowledge vacuum about the legal profession they launch.60 Our educational
approaches could benefit from systematic research, or even informal surveys of
alumni or continuing legal education participants, about what has been or
would be most useful from professional responsibility courses.
One central paradox in teaching those courses is that if our strategies have
been at all successful, students may end up with more questions than they had
when they began. That is not why they came to law school. But it is
unavoidable in professional responsibility classes that focus on the ethical
questions most worth discussing, where there are strong competing values and
interests at issue. On those questions, there may be no single “right” answer,
but some are more right than others. A central goal of the course is to help
students reason about those issues in ways that are responsive to the full range
of relevant concerns and opposing views.
Another strategy, and a point on which the course can close, is to remind
future practitioners of the opportunities and obligations that come with
membership in a largely self-regulating profession.
Lawyers have
considerable power over the terms of their own practice and a range of ways to
leave the world slightly better than they found it. The same is, of course, true
of law professors, especially those who teach legal ethics. The nature of the
subject matter imposes special obligations on faculty to consider whether they
are modeling the principles they preach in their professional conduct and
public service.61 This, of course, adds to the challenges for professors who are
60. See David B. Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of Professional Schools to Study
and Teach About the Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, The
Professional Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 26 (1999). For two
of the only published studies of graduates’ responses to questions about professional ethics
education, see Granfield & Koenig, supra note 3; James E. Moliterno, Professional
Preparedness: A Comparative Study of Law Graduates’ Perceived Readiness for Professional
Ethics Issues, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (1995).
61. As Cramton and Koniak put it, “Do we mouth principles or mean them?” Cramton &
Koniak, supra note 4, at 193; see also Lerman, supra note 15, at 479; Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow,
Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1991). For a
representative summary of appropriate practices, see Statement of Good Practices by Law
Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, in ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1997 HANDBOOK 89–94 (1997). For discussion of how faculty
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already taking on a difficult teaching task. But students pick up messages in
subtexts as well as texts, and faculty members’ own commitments inevitably
become part of the educational process. Those who profess on professional
responsibility have a special responsibility to inspire students and each other to
live up to their own best sense of what legal ethics requires.

too often fall short, see Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 70 (2006). For faculty members’ pro bono responsibilities, see RHODE, supra note 14, at
169–71; David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58
(1999).
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